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Plantinga on warrant and acceptability of Christian Belief

Stevan Rakonjac

2020 · DOI: 10.2298/theo2002103r
0 Citations

Abstract

Alvin Plantinga wants to answer the following question: Is Christian belief

intellectualy or rationaly acceptable? We will present the answer John Locke

gives, based on his evidentialism, to the aforementioned question, as well

as Plantinga?s critique of Locke?s evidentialist approach. Plantinga thinks

that the question ?Is Christian belief intellectualy or rationaly

acceptable?? is best understood as meaning ?Is Christian belief warranted??.

We will analyze Plantinga?s argument for the claim that Christian belief

probably has warrant if it is true, which implies that we first have to show

that Christian belief (probably) is false in order to show that it

(probably) has no warrant. But than that means that we have to show that

Christian belief is false in order to show that it is unacceptable, making

it very hard, if not impossible, to show that Christian belief is

unacceptable. We will then present one objection to Plantinga?s argument,

?the Great Pumpkin Objection?. Relying on Linda Zagzebski?s analysis, we

will claim that the Great Pupmpkin objection shows that Plantinga?s notion

of ?warrant? does not adequately capture the meaning of the relevant notion

of ?intellectual or rational acceptability? of beliefs, and that, hence, his

conclusion about warrant of Christian belief are not necessary relevant for

the claims about intellectual or rational acceptability of Christian belief.

We will also analyze a solution given by Kyle Scott. He thinks that if we

have, in addition to Plantinga?s argument showing that Christian belief is

warranted if true, favouring evidence in support of Christian belief, which

he thinks we obviously have, than Christian belief is acceptable. We will

point out that Scott does not elaborate what makes adequate favouring

evidence in support of some belief, and we will calim that adequate

understanding of favouring evidence will, in some respects, be very similar

to Locke?s evidentialism. If so, than Scott proposal will reintroduce some

elements of Locke?s evidentialism, and the question of whether there is

favouring evidence in support of Christian belief will not have an obvious

and easy answer.