Misunderstanding of Madhyamika's Perspective on Language

Many Western thought systems have been utilized for the purpose of interpreting Buddhism. The most popular of the system is so-called linguistic interpretation, which nearly gained acceptance as the authentic interpretation of Madhyamika Buddhism. Since in the late 1960's Wittgenstein's philosophy was seen to possess strong parallels with Buddhist thought, the interpretation of Madhyamika as a theory of language obtained almost unanimous consent among contemporary scholars. Before we equate Wittgenstein's theory of language with Madhyamika's perspective on language we should see that the limits of language in Wittgenstein's thought does not particularly refer to its limit in dealing with metaphysical objects. Although Wittgenstein's skepticism concerning the substantiality of language derived from his recognition of the metaphysical usage of language by professional philosophers, his skepticism extends to ordinary language. As it were, in his philosophy the sign in general is questioned. Since Wittgenstein's skeptical idea extends to language in general, his skepticism concerning language is quantitative, due to the fact that it derives from an empirical basis. The following examples may show this. When Wittgenstein talks about the possibility of "exact" in practicing "language-games," a similar idea is implied. Thus, when a housewife buys a pound of potatoes, her measurement will not be as exact as when a scientist measures a pound in the laboratory. 2) Although the limit of language, that is its inability to properly express the truth, has been acknowledged by Buddhists throughout the history of their tradition, the meaning of the limit of language here is very different from that used by Wittgenstein. The skeptical concept with regard to the reality of words in Madhyamika philosophy does not concern language in general. In the Madhyamaka-sastra the rule of language in general is called conventional use of language (vyavahara satva),