Cutting Losses: Ending Limited Interventions

Abstract: This article compares three limited interventions--the Bay of Pigs (1961), Beirut (1983), and Mogadishu (1992-93). Using Clausewitz's idea that the pursuit of military victory must be linked to a "political object," this essay focuses on the "retreat skill set" that allowed Presidents Kennedy, Reagan, and Clinton to conclude interventions whose costs had outrun potential benefits. These interventions can instruct today's strategic leaders, who will confront terrorist movements located in the failed states and mega-cities of the 21st century. ********** "Once the expenditure ... exceeds the value of the political object, the object must be renounced...." Carl von Clausewitz (1) Most American presidents have committed military force believing the outcome will be successful. Nonetheless, as the past half-century has shown, America's uses of military force sometimes failed to yield satisfying results. This review compares three us interventions--the Bay of Pigs (1961); Beirut (1983); and Mogadishu (1992-93)--which fell short of the hopes of the administrations that launched them. These three cases, which span four decades and the end of the Cold War, share a number of striking and suggestive similarities. They speak to the problems not only of limited interventions, but also of larger operations, including our dilemmas in Afghanistan and Iraq, and likely challenges in future operations against terrorist actors. Each episode under study here was presidentially driven and used limited military force as a catalyst for political change in a target country. In every case, the target society had a recent history of political-military conflict and contained what demographers call a "youth bulge," a population curve skewed in favor of the young, which included many military-age males. (2) In all three, the mission's outcome shocked the American president who had authorized it. Finally, in each instance, the us chief executive chose to end the operation and cut his losses rather than pursue victory. The president made his decision when, to borrow from the Prussian military theorist Carl von Clausewitz, the operation had reached the crossover point where its growing costs exceeded the value of its original "political object." (3) All three were regarded as political "disasters" in their times. Nonetheless, two of these presidents easily won reelection and in all likelihood John F. Kennedy would have done the same. This analysis maintains that studies of American warfare are too "victory centric." When scholars examine defeats, reversals, or frustrating results, they frequently use a victory-tinted lens. They ask, "What went wrong?" as they try to locate the reason for the absence of victory, a reason that is hopefully reversible in future operations. This approach treats victory as the norm and military frustration as an aberration, an attitude that distorts our understanding of conflict and its unpredictable results. Consequently, while this commentary elucidates certain classic problems in limited interventions, it focuses on "the loss-cutting skill set," those abilities that enable strategic leaders to accept a tactical reverse to avoid remaining mired in a protracted and likely more costly imbroglio. The cases start when the president received word his mission had gone awry. Historical background follows. (4) Finally, this essay analyzes how three presidents responded to mission failure and relates those responses to recent and likely future political-military challenges. JFK and Playa Giron On 18 April 1961, President John F. Kennedy hosted the annual Congressional Reception. During the event, bad news came in from Playa Giron (Giron Beach), the landing site for the Bay of Pigs invasion. The president had inherited this enterprise. The scheme provided logistical backing and limited air support to a 1,200-man, CIA-trained brigade of Cuban exiles that would land in Cuba and overthrow Fidel Castro. …