The “Other” Measure—the “Other” Technology? Heidegger and Far East Traditions—Commentary on Shan Wu’s Refining Technopoiesis: Measures and Measuring Thinking in Ancient China

In our philosophical attempts to understand technology, we usually address two questions, namely, what technology is and what technology can be. The latter seems to be heading toward the future as we seek to change the dissatisfactory current state of affairs. Yet, going forward does not always mean moving straight ahead; sometimes it requires taking a few steps backward. This could entail turning toward Aristotle and forgotten dimensions of technology, such as technopoiesis, which points to the significance of the technical process in and of itself (Amzallag, 2021); or it could entail taking a look at ancient China, where, as the paper by Shan Wu (2023) brilliantly shows us, the measurement system—rather than binding the thing being measured—enabled one to deal in a non-essentialist way with it, thereby capturing its own character. In this paper, I would like to comment on the proximity between this early approach and Heidegger’s own way of questioning our contemporary account of measurement, which is of crucial importance for his critique of technology. Heidegger’s preoccupation with the problem of measurement can be observed throughout his entire philosophical pathway: it starts in Being and Time (1927) and resurfaces in his investigations in the 1950s. While there are some differences between his earlier and later accounts, the underlying idea is one and the same: defining objective (that is, unified and standardized) measures is always subjective. This claim is not as paradoxical as it may appear at first glance; it in fact reflects the urge of the modern human being as a subject to take over reality and organize it according to itself. By this token, objective measures are external or alien (not their own) to the measured things. In Heidegger’s view, such an account cannot grasp the ontological peculiarity or “ownness”—neither of human beings nor of other beings. Heidegger’s approach, however, does not target the inaccessibility of things.